The jury is no longer out - many things that the coup-makers said would improve did not, or in fact worsened - but the jury appears to be blind and unable to learn anything substantial from the past 12 months. Here are a few issues society has failed to learn.

Many of those who supported the coup, ranging from the majority in the so-called "quality" print media, who were Thaksin's adversaries, to the so-called "tank liberals", can no longer try to claim that what has transpired over the past 12 months has been a success, economically or politically. They continue to fail to address the core issue of the coup being a problematic quick fix. They still think it was a necessary evil, but one in need of a better cast the next time round.

They may blame the government's failure to push for political reforms or revive the economy on false characters or bad casting, ranging from the junta-appointed prime minister Surayud Chulanont, who has been criticised as inefficient and lacking in vision, or junta leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin for succumbing to temptation by wanting to enter politics and hang on to power, but very few of the coup's supporters have managed to reflect and say that the coup d'etat was essentially wrong.

No one has summed up this sentiment better than media tycoon and People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) leader Sondhi Limthongkul on his popular TV programme last Friday. After all, Sondhi, the PAD leader, was the man behind the popular support for the "yellow coup" led by Sonthi the general. The PAD leader, in apparent bitterness after explaining how he fears that General Sonthi will want to hang on to power through other means and how he has failed to end endemic corruption, which he now claims plagues the military itself, said: "Today, the question is, what is the difference between you [General Sonthi] and Thaksin Shinawatra? Your mask has been unveiled and tell me how does it differ [from Thaksin]?"

But the media tycoon and PAD leader, along with many media outlets and intellectuals who are now criticising the Surayud administration, paid no attention to the act of the coup 12 months ago.

In summary, these people merely said that the coup was right and good, but the casting was flawed, period. So, for these people, the stage is set for future coups, hopefully with a genuinely good cast and for a genuinely good cause. And with politics filled with old faces doing the same merging and manoeuvring again, it is not hard to imagine these- pro-coup folks taking to the streets demanding yet another military takeover to "clean up" Thai politics yet again in the not-too-distant future.

The possibility of a military takeover has itself become a weekly fixture for local media, wherein leading politicians and generals are asked over and over again whether there will be yet another coup.

So, 15 years after the May 1992 revolt, the military has become a visible and major player in shaping Thai politics again. Even after one year of having an inefficient government, people seem unable to learn that a coup was not and can never be the answer because Thai society has become too complex to be administered by a handful of people, especially those who weren't elected.

It remains to be seen how many more coups it will take before this society will manage to learn.

The second major failure in learning has been society's inability to crack the code hidden beneath the notion of "samarn chan" or "reconciliation", which has been used to suppress political differences. Back in September of last year, social and political disunity was cited as a pretext for staging the coup, and many supported it as a result. But did "social and political disunity" disappear?

It didn't. But people failed to learn that it's not "disunity" that must be eradicated, but the belief that disunity is evil. What is needed is a recognition that political differences are normal in a democracy, but it's how those differences are handled that makes a society open and democratic.

Unfortunately, however, many long for a day without differences in political views or ideologies.

The third is the regretfully unchanging view towards the so-called "uneducated" poor, both rural and urban, who have been branded as victims of Thaksin's populist policies. These people are perceived as being concerned about short-term gains, but how do they differ from many of the so-called educated middle class who voted for the junta-sponsored referendum simply because they wanted to see a quick election and a stable economy?

The poor, it seems, make decisions based on the limited choices they have - for better or worse.

Now, what about lesson number four? Did we learn anything from Thaksin? Answer: those loathing him still loathe him as much as ever, while those in love with Mr T can't help missing him. It's as if both groups fail to see any grey areas. One such grey area is the fact that, whether you like Thaksin or not, he enabled the rural poor, who form the majority of the country, to recognise that their votes can make certain differences. Increasingly, the poor will continue to vote based on parties' policy platforms, despite the lingering patronage system.

The fifth and last question involves Thai society's dependence on a certain high institution as an anchor of social stability. One year after the coup, Thai society remains just as dependent on that institution, instead of learning how to better govern itself.