The content in this page ("Little good about the 'good' coup" by Thitinan Pongsudhirak) is not produced by Prachatai staff. Prachatai merely provides a platform, and the opinions stated here do not necessarily reflect those of Prachatai.

Little good about the 'good' coup

FOCUS / FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE SEPT 19, 2006 COUP          

In assessing the military coup on its first anniversary, one must say that the Sept 19, 2006 putsch has made advancements in unwarranted areas and limited headway on the many fronts it was designed to achieve. On some of their stated objectives, the coup-makers have flatly failed. The coup has turned out to be much less than anticipated, its costs far outweighing its justifications.         

It is instructive to view the coup through three lenses.         

The first is the benchmark which the ruling generals under the Council for National Security themselves set up. From the outset, their stated rationales were four-fold. Among these, only the issue of corruption has made noticeable progress.         

That the ousted regime under former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was corrupt is becoming indisputable in view of myriad indictments and outstanding arrest warrants against him and his family. However, the prosecutorial efforts against Mr Thaksin and his family have incurred extraordinary costs to the judicial system and the rule of law in Thailand.         

The prosecution of Mr Thaksin has gone so far that it is seen by many as political persecution, subjugating the rule of law to the power of men. The unintended, disconcerting consequence is that justice has been made subservient to power.         

Nevertheless, the CNS has succeeded in overthrowing Mr Thaksin and his monopolistic regime, and has seen to it through the Assets Scrutiny Committee, the Constitution Tribunal and other agencies that more than 60 billion baht of Mr Thaksin's family assets have been frozen and that his former Thai Rak Thai party has been disbanded, its leading executives banned from political office for five years.         

Yet despite the demonisation of Mr Thaksin, the Thaksin phenomenon lives on.         

The referendum results last month showed resilient support by way of a solid rejection of the military-backed charter in the North and Northeast underlined the CNS' failure to wipe out Mr Thaksin and his associates from the political map.         

On the other hand, the military junta itself has come under allegations of graft and nepotism. It has given itself salary raises, increased the Defence Ministry budget, and expanded personnel under the outdated communist-fighting Internal Security Operations Command (Isoc).         

Four-star generals have taken over chairmanships of major state-owned-enterprises, with few results but plenty of controversies.         

For their first explicit coup justification of Mr Thaksin's corruption, the CNS has had limited success as Mr Thaksin's regime is decapitated, much of his assets locked up, his personal incarceration in store, but his political legacy based on a patchy but popular pro-grassroots agenda is still very much intact.         

At the same time, the generals have fallen into the same trap of alleged corruption and abuses of power, albeit to a lesser degree.         

Other coup rationales included Mr Thaksin's polarisation of Thai society and usurpation and manipulation of the bureaucracy, particularly the anti-graft agencies under the abolished 1997 constitution.         

Political undercurrents over the past year, highlighted by the regionalised pattern of charter approval, have underscored Thailand's ongoing polarisation and fundamental conflict. The generals and their appointed interim government never made a genuine effort to bridge the deep divide between Mr Thaksin's supporters and opponents by conceding to the merits of _ and adopting _ some of the Thaksin government's policies that redressed neglected rural demands and expectations.         

Instead, the CNS and government of Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont brushed aside the upcountry anti-charter sentiments as ignorant vote sellers. On rectifying polarisation, the generals have utterly failed.         

The bureaucracy and various independent agencies within it have swung from Mr Thaksin to the CNS. Just as they were lured and pressured to serve under Mr Thaksin, the bureaucrats, soldiers, judges and others under state payroll have become instruments to carry out the priorities, preferences and objectives of the military and interim government. Bureaucrats are hardly more autonomous under the CNS' watch.         

That Mr Thaksin had acted in ways that may have insulted the monarchy was a charge the CNS never seriously pursued. For reasons that never entered the public domain, this charge was a non-starter from day one.         

On all four counts of coup execution, the CNS has botched the first on corruption, failed the second on polarisation, usurped the third on bureaucratic manipulation, and dropped the last soon after seizing power.         

A second way to gauge the coup after one year is broader. It centres on government performance. If the caretaker cabinet has been adept in meeting post-Thaksin public expectations, the coup might seem palatable for many. Effective governments tend to win the day even if their mandate is undemocratic.          But the Surayud government has been anything but effective.         

Its stated two-pronged platform of national reconciliation and sufficiency economy has made little ground.         

National reconciliation had two aims: addressing the wounds exposed by the year-long confrontation between pro- and anti-Thaksin forces that culminated with his ouster, and the Malay-Muslim insurgency in the southernmost border provinces. Reconciliation has not succeeded on either front, as polarisation continues and the southern violence worsens by the day, despite Gen Surayud's apology to southern Muslims early in his administration.         

As a government policy plank, sufficiency economy has brought confusion and controversy, especially on capital controls and unresolved foreign business practices.         

A lack of clear policy directions, underpinned by the government's sufficiency drive, has dampened growth prospects. The government's sufficiency emphasis has also run into the risks of hypocrisy. Prime Minister Surayud's more than 90 million baht in family assets has raised eyebrows, his land plot on a prime mountaintop not fully investigated.         

Yet a third view of the coup might focus on its overall logic and argument.         

This was supposed to be a ''good coup''. Thai democracy under Mr Thaksin was ill, monopolised and manipulated at will by the exiled premier and his cronies. Repairing Thailand's damaged democracy required its suspension until new rules could be instituted to return to a fuller, stronger democratic system.          But the 2007 constitution is not going to enable such a return. The new charter features a half-appointed Senate, reduced powers for elected representatives and more authority for the unelected judiciary and independent agencies to safeguard the interests of the traditional elite comprising the bureaucracy, the military and the monarchy.         

These new rules are elitist, and nowhere near the people's constitution of 1997.         

The coup that was supposed to lead to a better democracy has been proven to be a myth. The past year in Thailand bears the chief lesson that there is no such thing as a good coup.         

The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.      

Source: 
<p>http://www.bangkokpost.com</p>

Since 2007, Prachatai English has been covering underreported issues in Thailand, especially about democratization and human rights, despite the risk and pressure from the law and the authorities. However, with only 2 full-time reporters and increasing annual operating costs, keeping our work going is a challenge. Your support will ensure we stay a professional media source and be able to expand our team to meet the challenges and deliver timely and in-depth reporting.

• Simple steps to support Prachatai English

1. Bank transfer to account “โครงการหนังสือพิมพ์อินเทอร์เน็ต ประชาไท” or “Prachatai Online Newspaper” 091-0-21689-4, Krungthai Bank

2. Or, Transfer money via Paypal, to e-mail address: [email protected], please leave a comment on the transaction as “For Prachatai English”